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African Lessons from Latin American History? 
 
Africa and Latin America secured their independence from European colonial rule 
a century and half apart: most of Latin America after 1820
1 and most of Africa after 
1960. Despite the distance in time and space, independence was followed in each case by 
political instability, violent conflict and economic stagnation (lost decades) lasting about 
a half-century. The parallels between post-independence Latin America and Africa invite 
comparison. We argue here that the failure to achieve stability and growth resulted from 
similarities in the conditions that produced those unfavorable outcomes. We also argue 
that the post-imperial experiences of Latin American history suggest that Africa might 
now be entering a period of relative political stability and economic growth. In exploring 
the comparison, we proceed sequentially, first addressing the epoch of imperial rule and 
collapse, and then the post-imperial ‘lost decades.’ Following the comparison, we discuss 
the subsequent revival in Latin America, its implications for modern Africa, and offer 
reasons for believing that the latter may be recovering from its post-imperial decline and 




Economic Integration, Imperial Deterrent and Stability 
Imperial rule brought entire regions around the globe into direct contact with the 
tensions and rivalries between European states. Most colonies, however, did not become 
directly involved in military conflicts. In Latin America, the Dutch invaded Brazil’s 
                                                 
1 Cuba and Puerto Rico are exceptions.   4
sugar-rich northeast (1630-54); Spain lost most of its Caribbean possessions in the 
seventeenth century and fought to defend the rest for most of the eighteenth; Spain and 
Portuguese Brazil skirmished over territory that is now Uruguay. But for the most part, 
the mainland colonies did not become arenas of conflict because the competing powers 
had little interest in acquiring them. The imperial occupation of Africa also occurred with 
a relatively high level of courteous harmony (Hopkins 1973; Pakenham 1991; Abernethy 
2000), despite the belligerent nationalism that sparked the partition of the continent 
among the European powers. True, tensions rose in North Africa up to the Fashoda 
incident,
2 but only during World War I did imperial armies clash on the continent.  
Diplomacy rather than warfare generally marked their relationships and the result was an 
absence of conflict.  
Imperialism also brought a measure of economic integration. It fostered trade, if 
only because groups of colonies shared a single master. Trade and factor mobility were 
augmented within each of the imperial domains of Latin America. French-speaking 
territories in Africa formed a currency zone and sterling provided a common monetary 
standard for Britain’s African colonies. Central Africa maintained a free trade zone; 
Southern Africa maintained a common tariff; Britain promoted a common market for 
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in east Africa; and it also promoted the economic 
integration of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Central Africa. 
                                                 
2 The Fashoda Incident in Egyptian Sudan on September 8, 1898 was caused by territorial disputes between 
France and Great Britain. Both countries wanted to link together their colonies with a system of railroads. 
This led to the confrontation at Fashoda, where the French east-west axis met the British north-south axis. 
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The imperial powers also successfully contained or repressed internal challenges 
to colonial rule.  In Latin America, potential threats to colonial rule came from ambitious 
European settlers, enslaved Africans and their descendants, and burdened indigenous 
peasants. Colonial governments produced few public goods, spent nothing on education 
and next to nothing on infrastructure apart from fortresses and customs houses. Many 
functions of the modern state were left to associations formed by the settlers themselves: 
the church, the militia, the merchant guilds (consulados), and other private ‘corporate’ 
bodies. These settlers demanded more power, more privileges and lower taxes, and 
colonial courts and bureaucracies often served them better than the Crown. Spain and 
Portugal had virtually no police or professional military in their American colonies, but 
managed to deter (and occasionally suppress) settler-led revolts by maintaining their 
capacity to mobilize their vast imperial resources. This deterrent helped keep settler elites 
in line, as did the elites’ need for imperial protection from the slaves and indigenous 
peasants that surrounded them. Large-scale revolts by Indian and slave populations were 
rare in Latin America, although low-intensity resistance was endemic (Coatsworth 1988).   
Imperialism was also accompanied by an influx of European settlers into eastern 
and southern Africa in the early 20
th century and from Portugal into south central Africa 
in the 1950s. The settlers in Africa adopted repressive labor strategies, forcefully seized 
land, and drove the indigenous population into crowded reserves. By contrast, in Latin 
America the Crown had largely abandoned forced indigenous labor by the early 1600s 
(except in Peruvian mines) and made an effort to protect indigenous property rights. In 
both cases, natives were forced into formal labor markets to earn cash with which to pay 
taxes (Palmer and Parsons 1977).    6
Demographic Disaster and Indigenous Accommodation 
Perhaps the biggest difference between Latin American and African imperialism 
was its impact on demography. A century after Columbus’s first voyage, European 
disease had caused immense demographic damage in Latin America as the indigenous 
population shrank from perhaps 50 million in 1492 to as few as three to four million by 
the early seventeenth century (Livi-Bacci 2006). The Atlantic slave trade tried to 
substitute Africans for decimated indigenous Latin Americans but the addition of African 
slaves was far smaller than the subtraction of indigenous Latin Americans caused by 
European disease. Moreover, the Africans were not transported to the once densely 
populated highlands where the population losses were greatest, but mainly to the sugar-
rich tropics. The demographic collapse destroyed inherited power structures, facilitated 
religious and cultural assimilation, and helped raise the per capita income of the 
indigenous population which survived and resettled on the best lands.
3 When the 
indigenous population finally began to grow again in the mid-late seventeenth century, 
more than half had already succumbed to European domination. The rest lived on the 
colonial fringe (e.g. the Mexican north, the southern cone, and the vast Amazonian 
interior).  
While there is evidence of African epidemics occurring in the wake of imperial 
incursion in Africa (Kjekshus 1977), the death rate among the local populations never 
approached that which accompanied the massive collapse of indigenous Latin American 
populations. The forced emigration of more than nine million slaves to the Americas 
certainly had a positive impact on labor supplies, but it was relatively small and spread 
                                                 
3 Note the demographic parallel with Alwyn Young’s argument that today’s HIV-AIDS raises the incomes 
of those Africans who survive the disease (Young 2005).    7
out over four centuries. In contrast, local African political structures remained intact thus 
sometimes requiring the use of European military force to subjugate them. In other 
instances, as in Uganda and Northern Nigeria, occupation was achieved by aligning with 
local kingdoms or by pitting local groups against each other, i.e. by adopting policies of 




It is important to stress that the decline of imperialism in both Latin America and 
Africa was not driven by some endogenous response to local forces but rather by 
exogenous events in Europe. In the former case, it was the Napoleonic wars that eroded 
Iberian imperial power, while in the latter it was World War II. 
The collapse of the imperial deterrent occurred gradually for Portuguese Brazil 
and abruptly for the Spanish Americas. In Brazil, the Portuguese government fleeing 
Napoleon’s army arrived in ships protected by the British fleet in 1807. Independence 
occurred when the king reluctantly returned to Lisbon in 1821, leaving his son behind to 
declare Brazil an independent ‘empire.’ In the Spanish case, the imperial deterrent 
collapsed abruptly when Napoleon suddenly turned on the Spanish government. In 1808, 
he hustled the king (Carlos IV) and his eldest son (Fernando VII) off to a golden exile in 
Provence and installed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. By the time Fernando 
recovered his throne in 1813, both Spain and its empire had changed forever. For a brief 
time, it seemed possible to restore the status quo ante: the Hidalgo revolt in Mexico was 
crushed in 1810; dissident movements in the Andes were suppressed shortly thereafter;   8
and the Venezuelan rebels led by Bolivar were defeated in 1812. But disaster struck with 
an army revolt against the Crown in 1820. When the king faltered, settler elites in the 
empire understood they could no longer rely on Spain to protect them. Indeed, the 
resumption of Spanish liberal reforms threatened their privileges, just at a time when the 
scramble for political power already threatened to get out of control. Hidalgo had already 
proclaimed the end of the caste system and the legal equality of all Spanish subjects. 
Bolivar and San Martin offered freedom to slaves who joined them. Indigenous 
populations had stopped paying the hated head tax (tributo). Urban workers with no 
property demanded voting rights. The settler elites might look back wistfully to a quieter 
time of stability and order, but, with a weakened Spain turning liberal, insurrection and 
independence were around the Latin American corner. 
As in Spanish America, most of the African anti-colonial movements suffered 
initial defeats, but external shocks associated with World War II strengthened these 
movements while weakening the imperial powers. The imperialists traded war services 
for pledges of citizenship and equality. Financially exhausted by the costs of war, and 
embattled by anti-imperial uprisings in other portions of the globe, they also conceded 
power (albeit reluctantly) to local politicians. In the French territories, African voters won 
the right to elect representatives to the Parliament in Paris. In English-speaking Africa, 
the British appointed local politicians to legislative institutions; later, they filled these 
posts through elections; and later still they modified the Executive Council – the colonial 
governor’s Cabinet – in the same manner.  
The demise of imperial rule in Latin America and Africa differed in at least one 
major respect. Imperial political retreat in Africa was accompanied by economic   9
investment, and this investment was targeted at the traded portion of the economy.
4 The 
European powers emerged from World War II with immense debt and capital shortage; 
only Portugal emerged relatively unscathed by the fighting. In response to economic 
exigencies, they rendered imperial policy a branch of national economic policy. This 
meant promoting protectionism for France. Rather than importing cocoa or coffee from 
Latin America, France promoted their production in its African colonies. And rather than 
importing textiles, they instead encouraged national industries to expand their capacity by 
creating new plants in Africa (Boone 1990). For England and Belgium, it meant 
enhancing the capacity of their African colonies to produce goods for export to the dollar 
market. The post-war demand for African commodities grew as did colonial trade 
surpluses, and these surpluses were transferred to the home country where they were used 
to retire the war debt.
5 
 
Independence and Post Imperialism 
 
Post-Colonial Violence 
As the empires collapsed, so too did the imperial defense against external 
intervention and the imperial deterrent against internal strife. Latin America fell victim to 
                                                 
4 Latin America experienced a more ephemeral investment cycle in the early to mid 1820s, with two 
marked differences. First, the capital did not come from their former imperial countries, but rather from 
private banks and citizens in Britain and the Continent. Second, most of it went into bonds issued by the 
newly independent governments (though there was significant FDI in mining ventures in several countries, 
notably Mexico). The boom collapsed as governments defaulted on their debts and insecurity made FDI 
unprofitable. 
 
5 In the post-war period, Portugal – which had remained neutral in the World War II – also invested in its 
African territories. In the 1960s, Portugal promoted the settlement of hundreds of thousands of colonists in 
Angola and Mozambique. As had the French, Portugal sponsored the production by Portuguese firms in the 
colonies of goods for export to the homeland, namely, fish, sugar, tea, coffee, tea, textiles, and other 
products.   10
numerous external interventions (Table 1). Spain made serious efforts to re-conquer its 
colonies until well in to the 1830s. Britain, France, Spain, and other powers imposed 
blockades or landed troops to secure economic and military advantages, or to defend their 
foreign markets. Elite factions in many former colonies supported these interventions. 
Beginning in the 1820s, the United States competed directly with the British in Mexico, 
the Caribbean, Central America, and occasionally elsewhere, the two powers backing 
opposing factions in local civil conflicts. Relative to the industrial core, Latin America 
was a violent place between 1820 and 1870 where violent deaths averaged 1.16 per 
thousand, or 3.7 times that of western Europe. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Foreign incursions also increased in post-independence Africa. While avoiding a 
hot war on European soil, the Soviet Union and the United States were quite willing to 
spar on soil in the developing world. The cold war spilled over into the Congo on several 
occasions, with the USSR, China and Cuba supporting rebel movements in the East and 
the United States and its allies in NATO backing the central government. In the Horn of 
Africa, where tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia bred instability and conflict, the 
United States and the USSR again backed opposing sides. So too in South Africa, where 
the United States supported the Apartheid regime and its occupation of Namibia, while  
the Soviets and Cubans backed liberation movements there and in the Portuguese 
colonies of Mozambique and Angola. The result, especially in Angola, was widespread 
destruction of property and thousands killed. 
The newly independent Latin American countries did not possess internationally 
or even domestically recognized boundaries. Border wars, especially in Central America,   11
were provoked by efforts to reunify now-independent territories. The conflicts were very 
costly: between 1822 and 1860, military expenditures averaged about 77% of total 
budgets in Latin America. Conflicts over borders were less prevalent in Africa. Insofar as 
they did occur, they tended to center in the Horn, where Somalia sought to unite all 
Somalis into a single state, or to involve secessionist movements, as in Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
and Congo. Wars against minority regimes were more common, particularly in Southern 
Africa, where some were maintained by imperialist powers and others by colonial 
settlers. Many new African states virtually imploded after independence. Table 2 
summarizes evidence relating to violence in Africa between 1950 and 1973. Violent 
deaths averaged 2.38 per thousand in Africa over that period, or 6.4 times the OECD (see 
Table 2 for sources).  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Lost Decades and Violence 
In post-colonial Latin America and Africa, high levels of violence, political 
instability, economic balkanization, and anti-trade policies all sabotaged economic 
growth and reduced state capacities below the already low levels that had characterized 
the colonial regimes.  
Table 3 summarizes Latin American economic performance between 1820 and 
1870, where it is compared with the European ‘core’ (what we call in Table 3 the OECD) 
and with post-1950 Africa. Latin American per capita GDP growth rates were 0.07% per 
annum, or, adjusting for the dubious quality of the data, about zero. This during a period 
when per capita GDP was growing at 1% per annum in the industrializing European core.   12
The post-independence decades were clearly ones of dramatic falling behind for Latin 
America, and the correlation between conflict, violence and instability, on the one hand, 
and poor growth, on the other, was causal (Ponzio 2005). The African per capita GDP 
growth rate was 0.89% per annum between 1950 and 1992, this during an era when the 
European industrial core grew almost three times as fast. These post-independence 
decades were ones of dramatic falling behind for Africa, and it appears, once again, that 
conflict, violence and political instability were the root causes (Easterly and Levine 1997; 
Collier et al. 2002; Artadi and Sala-i-Matin 2003). In short, economic performance in the 
half-century after independence was abysmal in both Latin America and Africa in the 
post-imperial era. Lost decades indeed. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Collier and his collaborators (2002) offer insight into the impact of violence on 
private capital in Africa. Conflict affected both the composition and the quantity of 
capital. In the face of political instability, uncertainty over property rights and potential 
violence, individuals tend to hold more mobile forms of capital, liquid rather than fixed 
investments or land. And when fighting destroys old capital, investment in new capital 
also declines. The reduction in the demand for capital and the shift from fixed to liquid 
assets both promote capital flight. One estimate has it that 40% of private African wealth 
had been moved offshore by 1980: that “Africa has such a high proportion of its wealth 
abroad despite being capital-scarce is an indication of how much … other variables [like 
violence] matter” (Collier et al. 2002: 22). The authors imply that the threat of violent 
conflict is among the most important of these variables.   13
Using data for 1960-1996 from 43 African countries, Gyimah-Brempong and 
Corley (2005) find both a direct and a lagged relationship between civil war and 
economic growth, the channel of influence running through capital formation. The impact 
was very large relative to average growth rates, something in excess of 4 percentage 
points. Collier and his colleagues (1999) calculate that the longer term effect – or the 
‘overhang’ as they call it – has amounted to a reduction of 2.1 percentage points over the 
five years following a civil war. While lower than the Gyimah-Brempong and Corley 
(2005) estimate, it is sufficient to account for a major portion of the lost decades gap 
between Africa’s GDP per capita growth rate and that of other parts of the world. 
Either 1989 or 1991 could be taken as marking the end of the Cold War, and at 
that time Africa had about a quarter of the world’s nations,
6 about a tenth of the world’s 
population and about a twentieth of the world’s economic product.
 If dated with the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989, then 46% of the world’s civil wars were African at the end of 
the Cold War. If dated by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the figure is 53%.
7  In 
recent years, then, Africa has certainly supplied far more than its share of violent political 
conflict! It is perhaps for this reason that agencies rate Africa as the riskiest continent for 
investors (Collier et al. 1999). One can only suppose that the same political instability 
and violence explains the lack of foreign capital in post-independence Latin America 
after 1850 when the late 19
th century global capital market started its boom (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2004).   
                                                 
6 The denominator is the number of members of the United Nations (UN) or the number of nations with a 
population of one-million or more (POP). The numerator is the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), or the number of countries in Africa with a population of one million or more (SSA-POP). 
Accordingly, Africa’s percentage of the world’s nations is SSA/UN= 25%; or (SSA-POP)/(POP) = 23%. 
7  The figures are calculated from data gathered by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo on conflicts 
between insurgent groups and governments that generate 1,000 or more battle deaths per annum (Strand et 
al. 2002).  
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Lost Decades, Balkanization and Anti-Market Policy 
Both Latin America and Africa also suffered from economic balkanization which 
stemmed from fiscal, currency and market fragmentation. It might be supposed that 
balkanization in Latin America (Irigoin 2003; Prados 2006; Grafe and Irigoin 2006) 
would have had a smaller impact than in Africa since inter-colonial trade in the Americas 
had been modest or forced by colonial fiat.
8 However, protectionism driven by war-
related revenue needs diminished the positive impact that could have been expected from 
the destruction of the Iberian commercial monopolies. In any case, Table 4 gives us some 
notion as to what was lost by market fragmentation and protection in Latin America: in 
1820, the two biggest Spanish American economies had an average market size (GDP) 
only about one-quarter that of the average European core (OECD) country. The same was 
true of Brazil. In 1870, the figure for Argentina, Chile and Mexico combined was one-
seventh of the average European core country. If scale economies and internal trade 
mattered as much as economists think, Latin America lost a lot after independence since 
the combined market size of the former Spanish Americas was at least three-quarters the 
size of the average European core country, or more.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Balkanization took place in post-independence Africa as well, and to an even 
greater degree. By 1960, the French colonies had opted for self-government
9 and out of 
their respective federations. While they remained within a currency zone managed by 
France, each could now impose tariffs, regulate trade, and manage transport services with 
                                                 
8 For example, the inclusion of Upper Peru (Bolivia) within the Viceroyalty of La Plata, created in 1776, 
forced Bolivian miners to send their silver overland to Buenos Aires to be exported and to import products 
(mules, sugar) only from Argentina. 
9 Technically, they opted for “autonomy within the French community.”   15
an eye to their respective national jurisdictions rather than to international markets. The 
achievement of independence by Zambia and Malawi marked the break-up of the 
Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The East African High Commission also 
broke apart, as newly-independent Uganda and Tanzania sought to promote the growth of 
local industry. Throughout Africa, each newly-independent country issued its own 
currency. Both English- and French-speaking countries regulated the flow of labor and 
capital across its boundaries. Most also opted for import substituting industrial policies, 
seeking to promote the formation of local manufacturing despite the small size of local 
markets. In addition, governments adopted policies that fragmented transport networks. 
These hit hardest in southern Africa, where the imposition of economic sanctions on 
white minority regimes led to the seizure of railway rolling stock and the blockage of 
road shipments. Whether the comparison is made for 1950 or 1992, the average African 
economy had a market size only one-tenth that of the average OECD country. 
Economic growth in the post-imperial period was further impeded by policy 
choices in both regions. Not only did violent conflict raise the cost of doing business, but 
it also raised the demand for public revenues. New governments at war certainly needed 
revenues that could be collected easily, and there were other motivations to protect in 
Latin America.
10 Thus, one reason why Latin America failed to exploit the world trade 
boom before the belle époque was that it adopted aggressive anti-trade policies. 
Similarly, Africa failed to exploit the world trade boom which started sometime around 
1950. Table 5 offers some summary statistics confirming that both regions were highly 
                                                 
10 By 1865, and with the exception of the United States, Latin America had the highest tariffs in the world 
(Coatsworth and Williamson 2004). High post-independence tariffs in Latin America can be explained by 
war revenue needs, redistribution goals, domestic industrial policy, as well as other forces (Williamson 
2006a: chp. 7; Williamson 2007).   16
protectionist, anti-global, had high tariffs (and export taxes), and relied heavily on 
customs duties as a source of revenue. The average Latin American tariff rate in 1870 
was about 24%,
11 which was more than four times that of the European core. In the 
modern era where non-tariff barriers can be more effective in reducing trade, the tariff 
rate for Africa between 1971 and 1999 was still almost 15%, more than 30 times that of 
the OECD. Both regions scored or would have scored extremely low on the Sachs-
Warner openness index. In the case of Latin America, these negative anti-global factors 
swamped the positive effects that should have come from the dissolution of the Spanish 
imperial trade monopoly.
12  
[Table 5 about here] 
Most post-independence African governments adopted what could be called 
‘control regimes,’ a phrase which refers to a mix of anti-market policies, the most notable 
features of which were: the movement to a closed economy; the regulation, sponsorship 
and promotion of industry; and widespread intervention in markets (Ndulu and O'Connell 
2007). Prevailing economic doctrines, political commitments to socialism, and pressures 
for economic redistribution put a premium on interventionist policies. Indeed, 
governments adopted such policies in 60% of the cases by the mid-1970s (Figure 1).
13 
Thus, while the coastal economies of independent Africa may have been spared civil war 
in the post-imperial period (Figure2), like the rest of Africa they were still subjected to 
central economic control and anti-trade policies. This may help explain their failure to 
                                                 
11 An average tariff rate of 24% may seem modest, but it was consistent with much higher tariffs on import-
competing goods, like manufactures. 
12 Brazil is an exception to the rule. Virtual free trade had been declared by the Portuguese king, João IV, 
on his arrival in the colony in 1808, but the impact was minimal. Regional, separatist, and slave revolts 
wracked the country after independence, generating revenue needs and tariffs, although a commercial treaty 
with Britain kept tariff rates low initially.   
 
13 The figure exploits 46 countries, and averages over five year periods.   17
emulate the growth performance of coastal economies in other parts of the developing 
world in the late 20
th century, especially those of Asia. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The World Economic Environment 
What about exports per capita, another measure of openness? Table 6 reports 
impressive growth rates 1850-1912, after the lost decades, averaging a little more than 2 
percent per annum over the 62 years. The half century before 1850 is quite a different 
story: except for Chile, the growth rates of exports per capita are below 1 percent per 
annum, and in three cases they are below 0.4 percent per annum. The source of low and 
stable exports was certainly not faltering world demand since during its lost decades 
Latin America shared in the spectacular secular terms of trade boom which favored all 
commodity exporting periphery regions (Williamson 2006a: chp. 6). True, Figure 3 
suggests that Latin America had a less dramatic boom than did the rest of the periphery, 
but over the four decades between 1820 and 1860 the ratio of export to import prices in 
Latin America rose by more than 50%.  
What about post-independence Africa? Figure 4 presents a terms of trade series 
for sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2003. While the mid-late 1980s were certainly bad 
years for its commodity prices, Africa had twenty or even forty years (if we reach back to 
1940: Deaton 1999) of strong markets for its exports. Thus, the African and Latin 
American lost decades cannot simply be laid at the feet of poor world markets.  
[Figures 3 and 4, and Table 6, about here] 
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Violence and the Drift to Liberalism 
Post-independence violence and economic decline in both Africa and Latin 
America reduced state capacities and thus undermined economic strategies that required 
strong, centralized national governments – conservatism in most of Latin America, and 
“socialist” and regulatory states in Africa. Violence undermined many key institutions of 
colonial rule in Latin America: caste systems, slavery, state monopolies, internal 
customs,
14 trade regulations, taxes and fees that burdened urban consumption, state 
collection and enforcement of the tithe, and archaic property rights in land (like entail and 
mortmain). Conservative governments attempted to revive elements of the caste system 
in Bolivia and Peru, but enforcement depended on indigenous collaboration, which soon 
evaporated. Slave systems were undermined in western Hispaniola (Dominican Republic) 
and in those mainland colonies where independence leaders offered freedom to slaves 
who joined them (Bolivar in Venezuela and Columbia, San Martin in Argentina and 
Chile). Secularizing governments stopped enforcing the tithe. Entail (mayorazgo) was 
abolished. Church property was disentailed, and when the church resisted (as in Mexico), 
its properties were expropriated and sold. The hitherto inalienable lands assigned to 
indigenous villages and town councils (cabildos, ayuntamientos) were sold and efforts 
were undertaken to privatize public lands through auctions, grants, and colonization 
schemes. Reforms of the property rights system culminated in new civil and commercial 
codes after mid century. Fiscal necessity as much as ideology drove much of this activity, 
                                                 
14 This entailed the elimination of customs houses along roads and at city gates. Furthermore, restrictive 
regulations were abandoned, such as the rules mandating seizure of imported goods that deviated from 
specified routes into the interior and required document called guias to be signed at each destination and 
returned to the port of entry. All of these reforms were trade-creating, of course.  
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often accompanied by new tariff codes, fiscal reform, and the reorganization of judicial 
systems.  
The net effect of these institutional changes was to liberate economic activity 
from a burdensome colonial legacy. In that sense, Latin America’s civil wars and 
international conflicts of the post independence decades had a modernizing impact. They 
undermined and made unenforceable both the state-sanctioned private privileges of the 
region’s European elites and the myriad internal taxes, regulations, monopolies of the 
colonial regime. Latin America began drifting toward liberalism long before it became an 
ideology and a slogan.  
  Economic decline also undermined state-centered economic strategies in Africa 
and set in motion the liberalization of economic policies. Governments that had over-
valued their currencies, undermined export incentives and created incentives for 
smuggling. Because taxes on trade represented so large a portion of public revenues, 
public revenues declined. In addition, governments that had regulated industries and 
imposed price controls, created incentives for economic activity to shift to the informal 
economy, where it remained untaxed.  
Interventionist policies in Africa often added to fiscal crisis thus contributing to 
the collapse of political order. Further, as governments had retained power by targeting 
economic benefits to core constituencies, the decline in public revenues led to a rise in 
political instability. When governments could not pay their military forces – or paid them 
in worthless currencies, soldiers began to pay themselves in kind by engaging in extortion 
and looting, giving rise to high levels of economic insecurity.   20
A rising African public debt was held by international financial institutions, 
particularly the World Bank, which by the late 20
th century had assumed a major portion 
of the costs of government in Africa. The Bank increasingly pressured African 
governments to abandon policies that sought to override market forces and to adopt 
policies that harnessed market incentives (World Bank 1989). Attempts to stabilize the 
political and economic fortunes of the state in Africa thus led to liberal policy reform: 
abandonment of public deficits, price controls, and government monopolies (World Bank 
1994).  Figure 5 depicts the movement toward what has been labeled ‘syndrome free’ 
policies (Collier and O'Connell 2007).    
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Why Were the Lost Decades So Long? 
 Neither the pre-modern Iberian powers in Latin America nor the modern 
imperialists in Africa sought to create the social base for economic dynamism in their 
colonies. Nor did they succeed in doing so in spite of themselves. Latin America’s liberal 
drift took decades for two reasons: resistance by powerful settler elites and the relative 
weakness of the liberal movements that sought to dislodge them. In the most populous 
Latin American colonies, typified by Mexico and Peru, pre-independence economic elites 
resisted change because their class and ethnic interests linked them to the colonial 
regime. Colonial constraints on economic activity had impeded the development of an 
entrepreneurial or business class strong enough to end the dominance of the colonial 
elites and the civil strife that accompanied independence impoverished many whose 
occupations and interests inclined them toward liberalism. Argentina was exceptional in   21
that the absence of either an indigenous underclass or plantation slavery narrowed the 
post independence conflicts to squabbles over the spatial distribution of political power, 
with most liberals supporting a ‘unitary’ regime dominated by the port city of Buenos 
Aires. In other large countries, liberals were inevitably federalist, because they sought to 
accelerate the drift toward freer markets by making national governments even weaker. 
Political stalemate and economic stagnation slowed and at times partially reversed the 
region’s inexorable, if sometimes glacial draft toward liberalism, 
  In Africa, the delay in economic reform reflected the power of a perverse 
equilibrium where key actors realized the costs of inappropriate policy choices but could 
not unilaterally abandon their commitment to them. Policies toward agriculture illustrate 
the point. Urban labor, industry, and the governments themselves championed ‘low price’ 
policies for basic foodstuffs. Through retail price controls, monopsony purchasing, and 
the opening up of domestic markets to foreign imports (which could be purchased with 
over-valued currencies), governments sought to provide urban consumers with cheap 
food (Bates 1981). These policies raised real incomes for city workers, but also lowered 
the own-wage of urban labor and thus defended industrial profits. But these pro-urban 
policies undercut the profitability of agriculture (the largest sector of most African 
economies), and led – perversely but inevitably -- to shortages and higher prices, and 
reduced economic growth rates while undermining the legitimacy of governments. 
While the policies thus imposed significant costs on Africa’s states, they 
nonetheless endured. No labor leader could afford to demand their reversal. And no 
political leader could champion policies that would, initially at least, raise the cost of   22
living for urban consumers. As a result, the policies remained in place, even while 
undermining the economic wellbeing of the states that retained them. 
  
Reform and Recovery 
 
Nearly everything changed in Latin America after 1870. First, there came political 
(and often military) victory of Liberal political forces that imposed civic equality without 
regard to ethnicity, abolished slavery, separated church and state, put an end to archaic 
property rights in land, privatized public assets (especially land), and finally abolished 
internal customs and public monopolies. Second, long term stability was secured in most 
cases by means of historic compromises that reunited elite economic interests. Once 
conservatives accepted the new rules of the game, militarism and popular mobilization 
were replaced by governing arrangements that provided major domestic and foreign 
business groups secure access to influence. Third, the new political economy came to be 
embodied in modern civil and commercial codes, judicial reform and reorganization, new 
banking and insurance laws, renegotiation of domestic and external debts, tariff 
protection for industries in the larger economies, increasing public investment in physical 
infrastructure and security. Fourth, stability facilitated economic growth, which helped to 
cement the new political economy (Ponzio 2005): the income per capita growth rate was 
1.8% per annum for Latin America between 1870 and 1913 (Maddison 2003: 142). 
Economic growth was sustained by new investment, particularly foreign direct 
investment, which came first in response to government guarantees and subsidies   23
(railroads, public works, banking), and then to exploit new opportunities in export 
production and industry (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). 
These changes could not have been achieved in most countries without the 
previous conflict and bloodshed. Civil warfare destroyed many of the colonial institutions 
that Liberals sought to abolish long before the fighting stopped. This destructive phase of 
institutional modernization facilitated the transition to a second more constructive phase 
in which governments discovered -- often through trial and error over two or three 
decades -- the institutional arrangements and policies most likely to encourage 
investment and growth. The new regimes succeeded in eliminating (or at least 
diminishing) the political participation of popular classes especially in the countryside. 
They centralized power in provincial and national capitals, away from villages and small 
towns. They also installed, or enforced more rigorously, property and literacy limits on 
the franchise. Success in excluding most citizens from political influence and 
participation aided stability and economic growth, but disfavored a more egalitarian 
society and maximized short run returns on social overhead capital, foreign investment, 
foreign technology, and foreign skills. Still, most stable Latin American regimes of the 
late nineteenth century lacked the capacity or the incentives to create institutions that 
could credibly guarantee the property and civic rights of most citizens or give priority to 
investments in human capital. Thus, institutions favoring inclusive development did not 
develop.  
Sustained economic growth in the Latin American belle époque yielded an even 
greater concentration of assets and income. Economic modernization provoked   24
widespread increases in the concentration of land ownership,
15 wages rose more slowly 
than did per capita GDP (Williamson 1999), and inequality rose overall (Prados 2005). 
Those Latin American economies which achieved long term GDP per capita growth rates 
comparable to the United States (roughly 1.5% per year over the twentieth century), 
achieved it at the cost of persistent inequality and chronic social and political tension. 
In recent years, Africa has experienced a decline in political conflict.  While 
conflict continues on the Horn of Africa, the liberation wars in Southern Africa have 
come to an end; so too have the civil wars that followed the achievement of independence 
in Mozambique and Angola. While Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe are still torn by civil war, fourteen others have dropped from that list (Angola, 
Benin, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Congo). In many – especially Congo, Burundi, and 
Nigeria – peace remains fragile, but at least military conflict has stopped. 
A corollary of institutional reform was policy reform, with the abandonment of 
control regimes in favor of ones producing fewer price distortions, a greater reliance on 
market incentives, and less government regulation (see Figure 5: Ndulu et al. 2007). 
Unlike Latin America, where newly stable regimes worked to exclude majorities by 
restricting the franchise, Figure 6 shows that in Africa no-party (largely military) and 
single-party systems gave way to competitive party systems during the period of 
democratic reforms in the 1990s. That institutional reform and policy reform should go 
together in Africa should not be surprising. Small holder farms face high costs of 
organization, and so were ineffective lobbyists; but, being numerous, they constitute a 
large bloc of voters. And with the reintroduction of competitive party politics, rulers then 
                                                 
15 For the Mexican case, see Coatsworth (1974).   25
faced incentives to abandon the policies that had so long imposed heavy burdens on 
agriculture. 
Contemporary Africa has also experienced a rise in the demand for its exports. 
Fueled by the growth of Asian economies, and the economy of China in particular, Africa 
now benefits from a growing demand for primary products: timber, oil, and metals, in 
particular.
16 The result has been the achievement of the first spell of positive rates of 
economic growth since the first decade of independence, some 40 years previously 
(Table 7). 
[Figure 6 and Table 7 about here] 
 
Historical Lessons for Africa’s Future 
 
The comparison we have offered suggests cautious optimism for Africa’s future. 
One the one hand, Latin America finally emerged from the post-independence period into 
a second half-century of impressive growth and political stability, and there are signs that 
Africa may emulate Latin American experience. On the other hand, the social costs of the 
policies that led to this Latin American outcome were high, generating benefits to the 
few, economic inequality, and political exclusion. If history repeats, Africa too can grow, 
but the danger is that the achievement of economic growth and political stability may also 
come at high social cost. 
                                                 
16 It also benefits from a demand for simple labor-intensive manufactures. Sub-Saharan Africa is shifting 
out of mineral and agricultural exports and in to manufactures, although it only became apparent in the 
early 1990s. The share of manufactures in total exports in this region was only 12 or 13 percent in 1991, 
while it was almost 50 percent in 1998 (Martin 2003; Williamson 2006b: Figure 6).   26
The 1990s were marked by the rise of democracy and the overthrow of 
authoritarian regimes in Africa. Instead of single party politics or military rule, multi-
party politics prevailed in nearly 70% of Africa by 1995. In addition, governments 
increasingly adopted more liberal economic policies. The fall of communism, external 
pressures for policy reform, and the simple fact that governments that wished to remain 
in power had to compete for votes and so could no longer impose the kinds of policies 
that they once had favored. An economic benefit accompanied the end of political 
conflict. Much of Africa began to adopt more market-oriented policies to exploit those 
benefits. And a little help from expanding world markets reinforced improved economic 
performance: the rising demand for primary products from Asia’s growing economies has 
helped spark a resumption of growth in 21
st century Africa just as an accelerating world 
industrial revolution helped create the belle époque for late 19
th century Latin America. 
But will Africa pay the same price for modern economic growth as did Latin 
America? Will the growth of exports, the abandonment of monopolies, and the promotion 
of markets be accompanied by the rise of inequality and the consolidation of power by an 
oligarchic elite? There are certainly signs of such a trend: the privatization of public 
assets in Africa has already led to their accumulation by the political elite and a 
strengthened link between wealth and power. In two fundamental ways, however, 
Africa’s evolution is departing from Latin America history. First, there are no restrictions 
on the franchise in Africa’s emerging democracies, while there certainly were in most of 
Latin America until after 1950.  Second, recall that Africa’s population is composed of a 
far larger share of indigenous people and a far smaller share of European settlers and 
their descendants than was true of Latin America 150 years ago. As a result of the vastly   27
greater political weight of the indigenous population, the reform of private property rights 
to land, which could lead to concentration and inequality, remains off the political agenda 
in most African states, whereas it was central to the political agenda of the liberal regimes 
in 19
th century Latin America. Thus, perhaps Africa will not have to pay the same social 
inequality price for modern economic growth that Latin America did following its lost 
decades.   28
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          Table 1 Violence Indicators for Latin America 1800-1879 
          
Conflict Rate by Country  
1810-1870        
Country  International Conflicts  Civil Conflicts 
   Started  Ended  In Progress  Started  Ended  In Progress 
Argentina 4  4 0 6 5 1
Bolivia 3  3 0 0 0 0
Brazil 3  3 0 3 3 0
Chile 3  3 0 3 3 0
Colombia 2  2 0 4 4 0
Cuba 1  0 1      
Ecuador 2  2 0 2 2 0
Mexico 5  5 0 3 3 0
Paraguay 2  1 1 0 0 0
Peru 4  4 0 3 3 0
Uruguay 4  4 0 2 1 1
Venezuela 1  1 0      
           
Conflict Rate by 
Decade          
Decade  # Conflicts (ongoing)  Deaths 
   Int'l  Civil  Total  Int'l  Civil  Total 
1800-1809 0  0 0 0 0 0
1810-1819 4  0 4 474,360 0 474,360
1820-1829 7  4 11 307,439 0 307,439
1830-1839 5  7 12 2,565 6,000 8,565
1840-1849 3  8 11 18,000 129,680 147,680
1850-1859 2  13 15 1,300 219,388 220,688
1860-1869 5  10 15 332,000 25,141 357,141
1870-1879 4  6 10 14,000 4,500 18,500
           
Note: 0 = missing or insufficient data. Source: Singer and Small 1972: Chp. 4; Scheina 
2003: 93-375; Coatsworth 1988: 36-7. 
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    Table 2 Violence Indicators for 8 African Countries     
                                  1950-1973    
           
    Assassinations    14     
    General  Strikes  6     
    Guerrila  Warfare  38     
    Major  Government  Crises    23     
    Purges    37     
    Riots    102     
    Revolutions    25     
    Anti-government  Demonstrations    39     
           
    Note: The eight countries are: Cote d'Ivorie, Ethiopia,     
      Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and      
    Z a i r e .   Source: Banks 1976.     




                     Table 3  Summary Statistics of GDP Per Capita Growth 1820-70 and 1820 Levels 
        
   Latin America       Latin America          Africa            Africa 
     1820-1870    As Ratio to OECD      1950-1992    As Ratio to OECD 
       
GDP per capita level         
(in 1990 US dollars)  751 0.44 1099  0.1
       
GDP per capita growth rate  0.07% 0.07 0.89%  0.31
       
Source: Maddison 2003; Coatsworth 1998.      
Notes: All regional averages are weighted by population. Latin America = Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Pre-1870 OECD = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzwerland, and United Kingdom. Post-1950 Africa = Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zaire. 
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     Table 4  Market Size During Lost Decades 
  
           As Percent of 
         OECD Average 
  




Average   19.32
   





Average   18.21
   
Africa 1950   





South Africa  34.11
Tanzania 3.89
Zaire 6.91
Average   10.63
   
Africa 1992   





South Africa  28.20
Tanzania 3.41
Zaire 2.90
Average   9.17
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                           Table 5 Summary Statistics on Tariffs and Openness 
            
     Average Tariff    Average Tariff  Sachs-Warner Open     
        Rate 1870     Rate 1971-99             Indicators 
            (%)           (%)  1963  1992 
            
(1) Latin American     24.1      
(2) Western 
Europe     5.7      
Ratio (1)/(2)    4.23      
            
(3) Africa        14.9 0.066  0.177 
(4) European OECD     0.43 1  1 
Ratio (3)/(4)      34.75    
Ratio (4)/(3)        15.1  5.6 
            
Sources: Tariffrates 1971-99 from World Development Indicators online. Sachs-
Warner Open indicators from Sachs et al. (1995). Latin American 1870 tariff rates 
from data underlying Coatsworth and Williamson (2004). 
 
Notes: Latin America in 1870 includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru. Africa in 1971-99 includes Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zaire. All regional averages are population weighted. 
 
 
            
            
      Table 6  Latin American Exports per capita, in current US dollars 
           1800-1912    
            
          Growth Rate per annum (%) 
  Country/Year 1800  1850  1912     1800-1850         1850-1912 
            
 Argentina  10.03  10.3  62.1  0.05  2.89 
 Brazil  4.78  5  14.2  0.09  1.69 
 Chile  1.63  7.8  44.7  3.18  2.86 
 Cuba  18.35  22.2  64.7  0.38  1.74 
 Mexico  2.11  3.2  10.7  0.84  1.97 
 Peru  2.31  3.7  9.4  0.95  1.52 
            
            
  Sources: For 1850, Coatsworth (1998: 31). For 1800 and 1812, Bulmer- 
  Thomas (2003: 37).         
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   Table 7 GDP Per Capita Growth Rates  
   2000-2005 (% per annum) 
 
Region Growth  rate 
Europe & Central Asia       5.41 
European Monetary Union       1.34 
East Asia & Pacific       7.17 
Latin America & Caribbean       1.21 
Middle East & North Africa       2.01 
South Asia       4.24 
Sub-Saharan Africa       1.76 
 
Source: World Bank (2006).     39
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Figure 3 Terms of Trade Comparisons on the Up-Side:
















  Source: Williamson (2006b).   41
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